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Authenticating Tibet appears at just the right time toprovide Western readers with the necessary toolsfor understanding the crisis that has been shaking
the entire Tibetan cultural space within China since March
2008. 
Edited by A.-M. Blondeau and K. Buffetrille, two
researchers at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in
Paris, this work first appeared in French in 2002 under the
title Le Tibet est-il chinois? Réponses à cent questions chi-
noises (Albin Michel, 2002). In it, scholars of Tibetan stud-
ies offered responses to the questions and answers contained
in an official Chinese propaganda pamphlet, Tibet, 100
questions and answers (a French version of which appeared
in 1988, a year before its English-language counterpart).
This little book, which was circulated widely to Chinese
Embassies and the public at large, allowed the Chinese
authorities to offer their own view of the history of Sino-
Tibetan relations and Tibet’s development since 1950, and
particularly targeted Western tourists who follow the Tibetan
situation with great interest and often sympathetic concern. 
Lhasa had witnessed regular outbreaks of unrest since
September 1987. In view of the space given to these events,
one might think that the authorities considered this pam-
phlet necessary to brighten their image, tarnished by the
riots that had been harshly repressed and that ended in
March 1989 with the imposition of marshal law in Lhasa
(lifted in May 1990). In 2001, one year prior to the French
publication of these “responses to the questions and
answers,” the Chinese authorities issued a second, updated
edition of the white paper, with numerous changes made to
the 1989 edition. It was, however, too late to amend Le
Tibet est-il chinois?, which was already about to go to print.
Astonishingly, the work hardly attracted the attention it
deserved, despite the scientific rigour of its articles; admit-
tedly, Tibet was not in the spotlight in 2002 as it is today. 
Two years ago, the University of California Press decided to
undertake an English translation of this work, and its publi-
cation now is a good indication of its interest for an interna-
tional readership; it is also, hopefully, a recognition of its
qualities. These arguments might not in themselves justify a
critical review in these pages, however. The crucial interest
of this work in English lies in the fact that it takes account
of the changes (additions and dele-
tions of questions, reworking of the
overall structure) that distinguished
the second white paper from the 1989
version. This enables it to gauge the
changing priorities of the Chinese
government with regard to the ques-
tion of Tibet. Above all, in the areas
dealing with current affairs and which
are of vital importance for Tibet, such
as demography, the economy, and
rapid changes in political direction,
the English version of Blondeau and
Buffetrille’s work sets itself apart
through its significant updates and
original contributions, not least of
which is that of A. M. Fischer
(London School of Economics). For
several years now Fischer has been
recognised as the leading commenta-
tor on Tibet’s economy, thanks to his
very careful and novel reading of the
many statistics provided by the
Chinese government. Until quite
recently, this rich but daunting materi-
al had been very little explored by the community of schol-
ars working on Tibet, and never with such attention to detail. 
Whilst this work might not necessarily give readers definitive
answers to the complex questions about Tibet and Sino-
Tibetan relations raised by current events, the well-docu-
mented information it provides will at least enable them to
bolster their knowledge and think about the subject based
on precise data, often backed up by statistics. Thus, in the
first part, devoted to “Historical Facts” with contributions by
Anne-Marie
Blondeau, Katia
Buffetrille (eds),
Authenticating
Tibet: Answers
to China's 100
Questions,
Berkeley, UC Press,
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A. Chayet and S. Karmay (CNRS), P. Kvaerne
(University of Oslo), J. Panglung and H. Uebach (Bavarian
Academy of Science and the Humanities), T. Shakya
(University of British Columbia), and E. Sperling
(University of Indiana), we learn that the Yuanshi, the
dynastic history written one year after the fall of the Yuan
(Mongol) empire in 1368, did not include Tibet in its chap-
ters devoted to the extent of the empire’s land mass (p. 13).
The bold Chinese claim that Tibet has indisputably
belonged to China since the thirteenth century (the begin-
ning of the Mongol dynasty) is therefore turned on its head.
The complex history of relations between Tibet (or rather,
various acceptations of the word “Tibet”) and the neigh-
bouring empire, whether Mongol (Yuan, 1267-1368), Han
(Ming, 1368-1644), or Manchu (Qing, 1644-1911), is
spelled out here in detail that takes up nearly one quarter of
the book. The period characterised by the Tibetan govern-
ment as allowing “de facto independence” for Tibet also
gains from the eye cast by historians and anthropologists,
showing to what extent the Tibet of the Dalai Lamas was at
loggerheads with China over its actual status right from the
end of the nineteenth century. These scholars also bring out
the repercussions arising from British meddling in Sino-
Tibetan relations (British troops reached Lhasa in 1904),
undertaken for strategic and trade interests.
Duplicating the organisation of the Chinese tract, the sec-
ond part of the book deals with “human rights,” another sub-
ject that China knows is dear to the hearts of Westerners.
The responses here to the questions and answers are essen-
tially the work of R. Barnett (University of Columbia, New
York), an expert in contemporary Tibetan politics. The dis-
pute between the Chinese government and the Tibetan gov-
ernment in exile over figures relating to the situation of pris-
ons, including the number of people detained, the number
of victims that can be attributed to the invasion or liberation
of Tibet by Communist China, as well as judicial practices,
individual freedoms, education, and access to medical care,
is treated in detail, and highlights a deficit in human rights
in Tibet that matches, if not exceeds, that in China itself.
The measured responses offered by Barnett demonstrate,
however, that he adopts a critical stance towards the rheto-
ric of Dharamsala as much as he does towards the figures
and formulations put forward by China. Thus, on the ques-
tion of forced sterilisation, which is often picked up by pro-
Tibetan support groups in the West, Barnett recommends
caution, since such practices have been verified only in cer-
tain Tibetan areas lying outside the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR).
The third part is devoted to the Dalai Lama and Chinese
policy in this regard. The main point to emerge is that China
has not changed its attitude towards the Dalai Lama over
the years, but it should be noted in passing that the tone of
the Chinese tract is more restrained than the outburst of
hatred from Chinese leaders and media after the Tibetan
leader was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, a fiery
rhetoric that has been taken up with a renewed vigour since
March 2008.
The Chinese pamphlet also dealt with the thorny question
of demography, which enables the book’s writers to further
develop their thinking about the number of victims that can
be attributed to China’s incorporation of Tibet in the 1950s,
as well as to broach the subject of population transfers (in
the period 1950-1960) and economic migration (from the
1990s). Basing his work on official Chinese statistics, A. M.
Fischer shows that available figures do not conclusively sup-
port the hypothesis that a million Tibetans (that is, 20 per-
cent of the Tibetan population) died as victims of the inva-
sion/liberation in the 1950s – the view of Dharamsala,
which was contested a few years ago by Patrick French in
Tibet, Tibet (Knopf, NY, 2003). However, using Chinese
demographic statistics, Fischer analyses the development of
the Tibetan population in Qinghai Province (that is, a large
part of the inhabitants of the former traditional Tibetan
province of Amdo), for which figures are available from
1952 onwards. He shows on the one hand (p. 137) that the
Tibetan population there grew more slowly between 1952
and 1978 (+48%) than did the Muslim population over the
same period in this same province (+93%), and also more
slowly than the Chinese population overall (+73% between
1953 and 1982). Fischer attributes this phenomenon to “the
excessive loss of human life during the peaks of violence and
famine in the Tibetan areas between the mid-1950s and
1962” (ibid.). For the period 1957-1963, he goes on to
show (pp. 143-144) that the Tibetan population in Qinghai
dropped by 20 percent, as against 5 percent for the total
population of China (the Great Leap Forward being a
major cause of this decrease). The anti-Communist revolt
that ignited Amdo in 1958 and the famine caused by the
Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) are the main explana-
tions advanced for this figure. Fischer is careful not to
extend his conclusions to the whole of the Tibetan areas of
China, for which comparable data is lacking, but the fact
remains that he provides the first precise, irrefutable, and
overwhelming figures on this subject. 
As to the relocation of the Chinese population to “greater
Tibet,” Fischer observes that it mainly occurred in the peri-
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od 1950-1960 and did not last long due to the hardships
encountered. Whilst non-Tibetan migration remained mod-
erate in the countryside and pastoral areas, Fischer shows
that it became more marked in the cities from the mid-1990s
onwards, and especially from 2000. That was the year in
which the Xibu da kaifa campaign (the opening up of the
Western regions) was launched, supposedly to enable areas
that were sparsely populated (and populated especially by
“national minorities”), inhospitable, and relatively poor, to
take off economically thanks to the arrival en masse of non-
native people. Fischer raises an important point not previ-
ously highlighted, which is that whatever their number, Han
and Muslim Chinese who settled in the western cities
enjoyed an advantage in snaring available commercial oppor-
tunities due to language and inland networks, and elbowed
out Tibetans in the race to urbanisation and modernisation
(p. 151). 
One important and recurrent bone of contention for
Tibetans is the impediment to the freedom of worship, and
the subject of “religious belief” makes up the fifth part of the
work (ten questions out of the hundred). A.-M. Blondeau,
who is responsible for the whole set of answers here, shows
that the complacent tone of the Chinese answers stems
mainly from the formulation of the questions, which omitted
less consensual aspects of the situation. These include the
successive campaigns of political and patriotic re-education
imposed on monks and nuns since 1996, during which they
were obliged, inter alia, to disavow the Dalai Lama and pro-
claim Tibet to be part of China; the restrictive conditions for
admission into the monasteries; and the increasingly political
role of the administrative committees of the monasteries,
which were set up in 1959. Blondeau also takes note of the
public financing of monastery restoration, demonstrating that
it has targeted only a few spectacular tourist projects, to the
detriment of more modest places of worship ravaged by the
Cultural Revolution, the reconstruction of which was left to
the generosity of individuals. She observes in passing that
the official tract makes only brief mention of the Cultural
Revolution, with no specific reference to Tibet. This seems
to be the rhetoric currently adopted by China, which serves
a dual purpose. On the one hand, it minimises the real dis-
aster wrought by the “destruction of the four olds” (a slogan
of the Cultural Revolution) among the Tibetan people, who
were at the time and are still today deeply attached to reli-
gion and traditions. On the other hand, it avoids turning
Tibet into a special case, and thereby giving comfort to the
idea that Tibet is not China. 
The next chapter is devoted to the question of autonomy, a
point of friction between China and the Tibetan government
in exile. Indeed, China deems the question to have been set-
tled, since all of the areas where the Tibetan population is
in the majority are under a special, so-called autonomous
administrative regime, be it regional (the Tibet Autonomous
Region), prefectoral (the 11 Tibetan autonomous prefec-
tures in the neighbouring Chinese provinces of Qinghai,
Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan), or district (there are two
Tibetan autonomous districts). This status, granted to other
“national minorities” forming the majority in any given
administrative division, theoretically allows the population in
question to enjoy a certain freedom in the implementation of
policies, particularly in terms of education, culture, and the
economy, and it enforces a policy of affirmative action in
administration that favours these “national minorities”
(which are in this case the majority). 
However, as revealed by T. Dodin (University of Bonn),
one of the authors of the responses, a close reading of sta-
tistics provides a less rosy view of the autonomy enjoyed by
these territories: the percentage of Tibetan state employees
in the TAR has recently undergone a massive reduction (ris-
ing from nearly 63 percent in 1989 to 72 percent in 2000,
but dropping back to under 50 percent in 2003) and is well
below the proportion (92 percent) of Tibetans officially res-
ident in the TAR (p. 202). What is more, the Communist
Party and the army are not required to apply affirmative
action policies, and the low proportion of Tibetans (22 per-
cent) within the Chinese Communist Party of the TAR
makes it difficult to assert that Tibetan views are well repre-
sented. And as we know, the Chinese Communist Party also
presides over state administrations such as culture, health,
education, and justice, and various organisations such as the
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Propaganda poster celebrating the country’s unity
through the diversity of its population. The young woman
on the left is a Han and the one on the right, a Tibetan.
The slogan indicates: “Our mother’s name is China.” 
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Youth League and the Federation of Women, which are not
without power.
Culture and education are at the core of chapter 9. The
Chinese government often promotes Tibetan culture, and is
increasingly wont to do so with the development of tourism
(which quadrupled from one million visitors in 2004 to four
million in 2007). Support for publication of the epic of
Gesar, a literary and cultural monument in Tibet, for
Tibetan opera, and the art of the thangka (portable religious
representations often painted on cloth), as well as for archi-
tectural heritage and medicine, are among the areas in
which the Chinese government considers it has shown its
concern for protection and development. A.-M. Blondeau
and A. Heller (CNRS), as well as F. Meyer (EPHE) for
medicine, show that while such expressions of Tibetan cul-
ture have benefited to some extent from the attention given
by the Chinese authorities, the state has often tried to secu-
larise festivals, celebrations, and representations that in
times past were endowed with religious significance. The
famous “Horse Festival” of Jyekundo (Yushul, Qinghai),
which attracts thousands of visitors not only from China but
also from across the world to celebrate the equestrian feats
and agility of Tibetans, has been partially emptied of its reli-
gious content – prior to 1950, people used such occasions to
pay tribute to local divinities. When it comes to heritage, it
is true that Potala Palace has been the subject of many ren-
ovations; but Heller points out that the renovations are gen-
erally piecemeal and of very poor quality, and that the old
city of Lhasa has suffered from poorly planned urban devel-
opment and the vagaries of changing policies. However, the
conference held in 2004 on the conservation of architecture
and murals in Tibet, jointly organised by the University of
Tibet and a Norwegian university, enables one to maintain
a certain level of optimism.
The economy is dealt with in chapter 8, with A. Fischer
showing that the central government’s considerable invest-
ment in Tibet has brought little benefit to Tibetans. Indeed,
these investments, decided in the context of an urban and
centralised policy in which Tibetan cadres had barely any
say, have not been adapted to the socio-economic reality of
Tibet, which is still largely rural (nearly 90 percent of
Tibetans work in agriculture and herding). The positive
impact that major investment could have had on the local
population has been counteracted by government infrastruc-
ture imposing real estate projects that are essentially urban,
and the development of transport axes (including the spec-
tacular rail network linking Lhasa to several provincial capi-
tals) to the detriment of secondary road networks that would
have benefited the local economy. On the other hand, as
elsewhere in China, the gradual withdrawal of the state from
the sectors of education and health weigh heavily on those
with the lowest incomes, in this case the nomadic farm work-
ers and monks of Tibet. China’s professed philanthropy is
also tempered by the substantial benefits it reaps from the
exploitation of Tibet’s natural resources (water, flora and
fauna, forests, and minerals). 
The favourable policy towards migrants to the TAR begin-
ning in 1992, and followed by the Xibu da kaifa campaign,
resulted in a concentration of resources and businesses in
the hands of the Han and Hui ethnic groups, whose net-
works and knowledge of Chinese allow them to more quick-
ly and effectively develop small local businesses. Continuing
in the next chapter to consider the TAR’s relatively poor
economic development, Fischer shows that income dispari-
ty, a matter that worries the Chinese government because of
the tensions it causes, is even worse in the TAR than in the
rest of China. Thus, the growth rate, which has for some
years been higher in the TAR than in China proper, masks
a growing discrepancy in income among city dwellers
(Lhasa’s poverty rate of 11 percent is the third highest in
China, while its average income ranks seventh in the coun-
try – p. 300) and between urban and rural dwellers; the
urban-rural differential was closer to the national average in
the mid-1990s, but in 2001 it was the greatest in all China,
with incomes 5.6 times higher in the cities than in the coun-
tryside, as against 2.9 on average in China (p. 301).
The vexed question of slavery and bondage, customs and
festivals, is treated in the penultimate chapter, entitled
“Livelihood of the People.” K. Buffetrille, complementing
the responses given by R. Barnett on the same subject
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The Potala under 
palm trees.
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(question 19), offers insight into the social structures of pre-
1950 Tibet that is of particular value, given that the Chinese
justified the 1950 invasion/liberation of Tibet based partial-
ly on this situation. Whilst “ancient” Tibet was by no meas-
ure an earthly paradise, as some enthusiasts and zealots of
the Tibetan cause would suggest, the social relations prevail-
ing then cannot be reduced to a caricature of cruel masters
(the “three feudal lords” of the Tibetan government, the
aristocracy, and the monasteries) with the power of life and
death over their slaves or serfs, terms that should be used
with caution. This chapter carries on with a debate over the
poverty of Tibetans. The questions on customs and festivals,
jointly written with J. Gyatso (Harvard), provide a glimpse
into the richness of Tibetan tradition.
The final chapter, grouping ten of the hundred questions
that originally made up the white paper, is devoted to the
Lhasa demonstrations of 1989. It is interesting to see that
the second version of the white paper eliminated nine of
these questions, but the editors of the present work had the
good sense to retain them, and readers will find answers
here that are particularly welcome in the light of current
events. In fact, one can see, nearly 20 years earlier, the same
discourse incriminating “a handful of separatists,” the “Dalai
Lama clique,” and the four-pronged “destruction, sabotage,
looting, and burning” that was revived in the Chinese press
in 2008 to characterise the criminal acts of the rioters in
Lhasa. As in 1989, the Chinese government seems inca-
pable of self-criticism regarding its policy of intensive and
China-centred development in Tibet (the only two conces-
sions, regarding the arrests of innocent people and errors
imputable to the Cultural Revolution, having been omitted
from the second Chinese version). One may anticipate that
a third edition of the Chinese tract, if it ever appears, will
contain a chapter on the demonstrations of March-April
2008. Indeed, their scope and perhaps their international
impact have far exceeded those of nearly 20 years ago,
which were essentially confined to Lhasa, and for which the
means of information available at the time (or rather that
were not available: internet, mobile phone, SMS), deprived
them of the international coverage they received this year. 
This is a very commendable work indeed. It is nonetheless
not devoid of faults. For example, it would have been worth-
while to devote more space to the fundamental questions of
Tibetan language and education, even if the Chinese tract
includes only a few questions on the subject (a telling omis-
sion in itself). It would have been worth pointing out the
curious absence of any secondary school in the Tibet
Autonomous Region using Tibetan as the language of
instruction. (1) In addition, an exploration of the network of
neidi classes and schools throughout inland China that
receive secondary school and higher education students
from the TAR would have been welcome. These classes and
institutes of learning, reserved for the best Tibetan primary
school pupils from the TAR, provide secondary and tertiary
studies in Chinese by Chinese teachers. This system, which
has been operating since 1985, has now trained more than
25,000 young Tibetans. In their reply to question 75 (p.
236), A.-M. Blondeau and A. Heller describe the opening
of such classes as an attempt to remedy the massive illitera-
cy of Tibetans, which is the highest in all of China, but this
reveals a certain misconception as to how these schools (or
classes) function. An article casting light on this subject,
published by two Chinese researchers in 2003, (2) showed
that, out of the 40 to 41 weekly hours of classes in the first
three years of junior secondary school, only six are devoted
to the Tibetan language. (3) The article further indicates that
these students are not meant to return home during the
seven to 12 years of their schooling, or to mix with other
Tibetans who might reside in the same city as them (p.
100). On the subject of this new elite, illiterate in its own
mother tongue, we now have two new sources, both of
which appeared too late to be referenced by contributors to
Authenticating Tibet, but which are worth mentioning
here. (4)
The second criticism relates to the geographical coverage of
“Tibet.” As the events of March 2008 have clearly demon-
strated, the presence of Tibetans, far from being confined to
the TAR alone, is massive in vast areas of the provinces of
Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and, to a much lesser extent,
Yunnan. This reality, whilst known to specialists, has long
remained invisible to the general public, whether Chinese or
Western. However, most contacts, studies, and fieldwork on
which scholars of Tibet have been relying for more than 20
years tend to focus on the TAR to the detriment of Amdo
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1. “Tibetan language teaching at primary level was introduced in 1985. It was meant to
have been followed by the gradual introduction of Tibetan language at the secondary
level, but this was never implemented. […] In 1996, projects to develop the teaching of
Tibetan language at the secondary level were abandoned.” Catriona Bass, “Le dévelop-
pement de l'enseignement”, in Action poétique, n° 157, Winter 1999, p. 72 and 74 (edi-
tor's translation). For a review of education policies in the TAR since 1950, see Catriona
Bass, Education in Tibet. Policy and Practice since 1950, London, Zed books, 1998.
2. Wang Chengzhi and Zhou Quanhou, « Minority Education in China : From State-
Preferential Policies to Dislocated Tibetan Schools », Educational Studies, vol. 29, n° 1,
p. 85-104.
3. Ibid., table VI, p. 101.
4. Zhu Zhiyong, State Schooling and Ethnic Identity. The Politics of a Tibetan Neidi
Secondary School in China, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2007 ; Educational Review,
vol. 60, n° 1, 2008, « Special Issue : Education of Tibetans ».
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and Kham, and the responses in this book likewise mainly
concern the TAR. Thus, there is still a lack of clarity about
education policies outside of the TAR, where there are, in
fact, junior and senior secondary schools operating with
Tibetan as the language of instruction. The same observa-
tion can be made in relation to other subjects, such as the
question of autonomy, the economy, or culture. The rich and
detailed contribution by F. Meyer on the development of
medicine in Tibet since 1950 would have gained from tak-
ing account of the medical colleges of Xining (Qinghai),
Dzorge and Tsö (Gansu), for example, as well as the many
publications that have come out of these provinces.
Finally, more maps would have been very welcome, particu-
larly to illustrate the part concerned with history, which read-
ers unfamiliar with the mountainous regions of Central Asia
are likely to find hard going. The original French version also
included a photo album, and it is a pity that the American
publisher did not think it worthwhile to reproduce this.
We will conclude with two wishes. The first is for Chinese
and Tibetan scholars in China to publish a third version,
also brought up to date, but with as much material and detail
– and therefore as demanding and rigorous – as
Authenticating Tibet. Secondly, it would be very worthwhile
for a Chinese publisher to translate this current volume, as
it gives a number of new insights, both indispensable and
serious, into the “Tibetan question,” which, as recent events
have shown, is far from being settled. Whilst Westerners
have access to a range of voices and contrasting views (albeit
overwhelmingly sympathetic) on the Tibetan problem,
Chinese citizens are often forced to rely largely on the
Chinese media, which in the great majority of cases is sub-
ject to censorship and self-censorship. The events in Lhasa
in 2008 have given rise to a few measured opinions in some
progressive media. These have been quickly called to order,
however, as the limit of tolerance in the treatment of Tibetan
affairs seems to be more quickly reached than on other sub-
jects. At the same time, the media, in particular the Internet,
have been inundated with a chorus of peremptory, national-
istic, and highly unsympathetic reactions to the Tibetan
question. It is urgent that on this point (as on others)
Chinese citizens should have access to less impassioned and
more substantiated information, to prevent a radicalisation of
tensions between Hans and Tibetans in China. If this book
is published in Hong Kong or Taiwan, it will quickly reach
the book market in the People’s Republic of China through
backdoor channels. It could then contribute to initiating the
questioning of a good many assumptions. •
• Translated by Peter Brown
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